Britain Does Covert Action Too. It’s Just Better at Keeping it Covert
When most people think of covert action, they think of the CIA and dramatic paramilitary operations at the height of the Cold War. They think of coups; of Guatemala and the Bay of Pigs; of rebels fighting Soviet occupation in Afghanistan; of outlandish assassination attempts involving exploding cigars.
This is only part of the story. The United Kingdom has long engaged in covert action too. In fact, the UK has engaged in covert action since before the United States was created; even since before the United Kingdom itself was created. Queen Elizabeth I talked of using ‘covert meanes’ to counter Spanish influence back in the 16th century.
Since the end of the Second World War, Britain has adopted a flexible approach to covert action. It is simply the deniable interference in the affairs of another state or non-state actor. It is “doing s
tuff” covertly. Anyone can conduct it: SIS, Special Forces, propagandists etc. The means not the actor is most important. This allows greater flexibility than the less opaque American approach.
Covert action has had a continual – if discreet – presence in contemporary British history. Successive governments have drawn on the assets of the secret state to intervene behind the Iron Curtain, across the Middle East, in Southeast Asia, South America, and even on the streets of Northern Ireland.
In doing so, the UK has developed its own distinct approach to covert action. The “British Way” includes:
a) Status Quo
British covert action is defensive, seeking to maintain the status quo. Unable to meet global commitments with ever decreasing resources, successive governments turned to covert action to protect British influence through smoke and mirrors. Even the seemingly most aggressive operations, such as the overthrow of the Iranian prime minister in 1953, were about maintaining influence and status in the face of a nationalist challenge. For Whitehall, covert action is reactive, perceived in terms of counter-attack. Britain does not – and has never done – propaganda; only counter-propaganda. It does not – and has never done – subversion; only counter-subversion. If too reactive however, covert action formed part of a British “whack-a-mole” approach to international relations, another example of Whitehall muddling through.
b) Caution
British covert action is cautious. The majority of operations involved small-scale “pinpricks”, designed to disrupt the opponent. Since the 1950s, this has included disrupting Egyptian subversive bases in Yemen, Indonesian military activity against Malaysia, supply routes feeding the Omani insurgency, terrorists in Northern Ireland, Uruguay, and Lebanon, and Soviet activity in Afghanistan. It was far less common for SIS to sponsor insurgents and overturn regimes. Even the more ambitious operations, such as the intended liberation of Albania in the late 1940s began as a limited attempt to disrupt supply lines to the Communists in the Greek Civil War. Britain has not overthrown a foreign government since 1970. Disrupting and discrediting is overwhelmingly preferred.
c) Maximum Deniability
Stemming from Whitehall’s caution, British leaders sought to make covert action as deniable as possible. This was to ensure that operations could not be traced back to London and prime ministers could maintain their supposed reputation for fair play on the global stage. Maximising deniability involved working through allies from the US to Iraq, persuading others to act instead, facilitating dissident networks, and creating conditions conducive to a coup. This seemed logical: Britain would escape the blame if things went wrong. Yet it often involved sacrificing control for the sake of anonymity. This was a dangerous trade-off, and one which occasionally led to assassination.
d) Propaganda
The vast majority of covert action does not involve silencers or poisoned umbrellas. It rather consists of subtle information operations. And unattributable propaganda (mostly grey, sometimes black) has formed the backbone of British activity. Propaganda has long sought to divide and discredit opponents, from Communist officials to nationalist agitators to terrorist recruiters. More than this, propaganda enables other, more active, operations. It can, for example, create the perfect atmosphere for a coup. Or it can ensure that an act of sabotage has the greatest possible effect.
e) Policy integration
This is not a story of so-called rogue elephants and robber barons; of intelligence officers going off script. Since the end of the Second World War, the Foreign Office has had a veto over operations and British covert action is accordingly integrated into the policymaking process. Very few examples exist of covert action conducted without approval. A remarkable number can be traced back to the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.
Britain continues to face threats from Russia and international terrorism. We can confidently assume that covert action – as reactive, cautious and disruptive as ever – remains a favoured weapon in the policy arsenal today.
