Operation Coldfeet: From a Russian Ice Station, With Love…
Introduction
During the Cold War, an important but often forgotten theatre of military operations where the US and Soviet Union sought to counter each other was the Arctic. This was partly due to the fact that the Arctic region represented the shortest route between the two countries, and the US was particularly worried that if the Soviets attempted an invasion of North America, it may come from the Polar North. However, the Arctic was also strategically important for another reason: intelligence collection.
One of the most important but barely acknowledged areas of Arctic Cold War intelligence involved the use of drifting ice stations. These were flat ice floes upon which bases could be established for Arctic research and exploration, the use of which were pioneered by the Russians.[1] But that wasn’t the main reason the USSR was interested in using them, as another key function of these ice stations was their use in espionage operations. When the Soviets abandoned one of their ice stations, the US spotted an opportunity to retrieve valuable intelligence, which led them to plan and execute a daring mission, codenamed Operation Coldfeet.
Arctic Ice Spies
In May 1961, a US Navy patrol aircraft conducting an aeromagnetic survey in the Arctic Ocean spotted the Russian ice station (named NP-9), which had been abandoned due to bad weather. When Leonard LeSchack, a naval lieutenant with the Office of Naval Research’s Arctic Program heard about NP-9’s discovery, he became interested in developing a plan to learn more about the Soviets’ activities on these ice stations.[2]
LeSchack wanted to find out whether the Soviets work on the drifting ice stations went beyond merely weather observation and basic scientific research.[3] He thought that the USSR would be very interested in obtaining information on the number of American submarines that were operating under the polar ice pack.[4] Indeed, when it came to the use of drifting ice stations, the Russians were more advanced than the United States. As historian William Leary notes, the Soviets “maintained a vigorous drifting station program in the Arctic Ocean during the Cold War, establishing far more bases than the United States.” These stations provided excellent platforms for “gathering the under-ice acoustical data needed for tracking submarines.”[5]
LeSchack was extremely interested in the discovery of NP-9 because the U.S. intelligence community knew very little about what the USSR was doing on these stations during the early 1960’s.[6] The United States wanted to know whether the Soviets were capable of detecting American under-ice submarines. The Americans were also concerned that the USSR might be developing Arctic anti-submarine warfare measures.[7]
LeSchack argued that significant intelligence could be gathered from investigating a Soviet abandoned drift station such as NP-9; specifically, information regarding notes, procedures, equipment, areas of specialisation, and, most importantly, the possibility of assessing “Soviet progress with acoustical detection systems.”[8] In 1960, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) had set up an acoustical surveillance network on an American drift station used to track Soviet submarines.[9] Although ONR surmised that the USSR probably had a similar tracking system, they had no direct evidence of this, and were hoping to find out from examining NP-9.[10] The problem with such a scenario was obvious – not so much dropping men onto the ice to collect intelligence, but retrieving them when finished.[11]
The Fulton Skyhook
The solution came about thanks to inventor, Robert Fulton, who devised the means by which two men could be successfully retrieved from the ice station: the ‘Skyhook.’ Although originally intended by the Navy for rescue work, the system had already been successfully tested in the Arctic and the idea was formulated for its use in Operation Coldfeet.[12] The Skyhook or aerial retrieval system was funded by the ONR and was a complex system which had been in development since 1953.
As William Leary describes, the Skyhook system consisted of a “500 foot, high-strength, braided nylon line,” to which was attached a zeppelin-shaped balloon which raised the line to full height.[13] The balloon was inflated by means of a portable helium bottle.[14] On the aircraft which was to be the ‘pickup,’ two thirty foot long cylindrical steel ‘horns’ were attached to the nose, and were spread at a 70 degree angle.[15] When attempting retrieval, the aircraft would fly into the fully raised line at the 425 foot level.[16] As the line was caught between the aircraft’s two metal ‘horns,’ the balloon was released, and at the same time, the ‘sky anchor’ (a spring-loaded mechanism), was triggered, securing in place the line to the aircraft.[17] The line was then snared by the pickup team using a J-hook and attached to a powerful winch which pulled it (and them), on board.[18]
Captain John Cadwalader, a senior colleague of LeShack at the ONR’s Arctic Program, (and Operation Coldfeet’s commander), thought the operation would provide the perfect opportunity to test the Fulton Skyhook retrieval system.[19]. By the winter of 1962 however, Operation Coldfeet had stalled as weather conditions made landing on the abandoned ice station difficult and the required support aircraft could not be found.[20] Also by this stage, ONR’s funding for the project had run out and ONR decided that the wider intelligence community (who had previously expressed interest in the plan) might be persuaded to support the operation.[21]
[Photo Credit: CIA.gov]
By coincidence, Robert Fulton had been working with the CIA on development of his Skyhook system since 1961.[22] The CIA’s secret proprietary company Intermountain Aviation had agreed to supply its B-17 aircraft, which were suitable for the Skyhook system to be attached to.[23] Intermountain’s aircraft were well suited to covert operations having been used before in the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961.[24]
By March of 1962, the USSR announced that they had abandoned their NP-8 ice station after its runway had been destroyed by a heavy build-up of ice (a pressure ridge).[25] The decision was then made to switch the target of the operation from ice station NP-9 to NP-8. More than one factor influenced this decision; firstly, by this time NP-9 had drifted too far away from the planned launch point of Thule, Greenland[26]; secondly, the Coldfeet mission leaders decided that NP-9 would be a better target for their objectives.[27] LeSchack and Cadwalader concluded that “NP-8 would likely display evidence of more recent submarine surveillance work than NP-9.” [28] After $30,000 of new funding was obtained from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the mission was now on.[29]
Along with Lt. LeSchack, Major James Smith of the USAF, an experienced paratrooper and Russian linguist, was chosen to be dropped onto NP-9.[30] On May 28th, the men were successfully dropped onto the ice, and were picked up 5 days later on June 3rd.[31] They returned with a precious haul of 83 documents, 21 pieces of equipment and over 300 photographs, along extensive notes.[32]
Project Coldfeet was hailed as a great intelligence success, and the ONR stated that “The U.S. intelligence community now has a tremendously more accurate and positive mass of data upon which to base its evaluation of Soviet activities on Arctic drift stations…Only from first hand observation by qualified observers could such an unusual and concrete intelligence result have been obtained.” [33] The operation confirmed U.S. suspicions that the Soviets attached very great importance to acoustical work.[34] The documents and equipment obtained also showed that the Russians’ research in polar meteorology and oceanography was superior to the U.S.[35]
The Bond Connection
In an interesting case of art literally ‘mirroring life,’ the CIA soon had Hollywood knocking at the door. In 1965, filmmakers hired the actual B-17 plane that had been used in the Coldfeet operation, complete with the Fulton Skyhook attached, to feature in the most renowned gadget-filled spy saga of all time – James Bond.[36] The plane, flown by real CIA pilot Robert Zimmer, was featured at the end of the film Thunderball, when it was used to rescue James Bond (Sean Connery) and his ubiquitous female companion from the ocean. Q no doubt, must have been impressed with the efficient pickup.
The Fulton Skyhook as featured in Thunderball
The Skyhook’s Legacy
Whilst details about the operation were more fully revealed in a book co-written by Leonard LeShack in 1996, [37] information on use of the Skyhook post-1965 is scarce. This is because after Coldfeet, the Skyhook entered the inventory of specialised, clandestine operations.[38] Additionally, despite its success in the Arctic, the CIA notes that, “While the Skyhook system provided an important asset for all manner of intelligence operations, its utility as a long-range pickup system was somewhat undermined during the 1960s by the development of an aerial refueling capability for helicopters.”[39] The system did continue to be used in some covert operations after Coldfeet, but, “its subsequent use by CIA and the military services remains shrouded in secrecy.” [40]
Endnotes
[1] Sean M. Maloney, “Canada’s Arctic Sky Spies: The Director’s Cut,” Canadian Military Journal 9:1 (Spring, 2008): 80.
[2] William M. Leary and Leonard A. LeSchack, Project Coldfeet: Secret Mission to a Soviet Ice Station (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 74.
[3] Ibid, 74.
[4] Ibid, 74.
[5] Ibid, 4.
[6] Ibid, 4.
[7] Ibid, 4.
[8] Ibid, 74-75.
[9] Central Intelligence Agency, “Robert Fulton’s Skyhook and Operation Coldfeet: A good pick-me-up,” by William M. Leary, 102, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/95unclass/Leary.html.
[10] Ibid, 102.
[11] William M. Leary and Leonard A. LeSchack, Project Coldfeet: Secret Mission to a Soviet Ice Station (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 75.
[12] Ibid, 75.
[13] Central Intelligence Agency, “Robert Fulton’s Skyhook and Operation Coldfeet: A good pick-me-up,” by William M. Leary, 101, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/95unclass/Leary.html.
[14] Ibid, 101.
[15] Ibid, 101.
[16] Ibid, 101.
[17] Ibid, 101-102.
[18] Ibid, 102.
[19] Ibid, 102.
[20] Ibid, 103.
[21] Ibid, 103.
[22] Ibid, 103.
[23] William M. Leary and Leonard A. LeSchack, Project Coldfeet: Secret Mission to a Soviet Ice Station (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 106, 107-122.
[24] Ibid, 115-119.
[25] Central Intelligence Agency, “Robert Fulton’s Skyhook and Operation Coldfeet: A good pick-me-up,” by William M. Leary, 103, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/95unclass/Leary.html.
[26] Ibid, 103.
[27] William M. Leary and Leonard A. LeSchack, Project Coldfeet: Secret Mission to a Soviet Ice Station (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 97.
[28] Ibid, 97.
[29] Ibid, 106.
[30] Central Intelligence Agency, “Robert Fulton’s Skyhook and Operation Coldfeet: A good pick-me-up,” by William M. Leary, 102, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/95unclass/Leary.html.
[31] William M. Leary and Leonard A. LeSchack, Project Coldfeet: Secret Mission to a Soviet Ice Station (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 129-130, 147.
[32] Ibid, 148.
[33] Ibid, 149.
[34] Central Intelligence Agency, “Robert Fulton’s Skyhook and Operation Coldfeet: A good pick-me-up,” by William M. Leary, 107, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/95unclass/Leary.html.
[35] Ibid, 107.
[36] William M. Leary and Leonard A. LeSchack, Project Coldfeet: Secret Mission to a Soviet Ice Station (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 152.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid, 152.
[39] Central Intelligence Agency, “Robert Fulton’s Skyhook and Operation Coldfeet: A good pick-me-up,” by William M. Leary, 108, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/95unclass/Leary.html.
[40]Ibid.
